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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A. Background  
 
1. Globalisation has been the catalyst for an expansion of economic activities 
among states, transnational corporations, enterprises and individual 
investors, which are now leading the mutation of international economic 
paradigm. In the past, individuals were excluded from participating in the 
international arena. Nevertheless, the appearance of international special 
regimes provides tangible evidence of the important roles that, currently, 
individuals play in the international order.   
 
2. Investment treaty law is one example of those special regimes that have 
allowed for and facilitated the participation of individuals in the 
international sphere. Since 1950s, some states have shown a growing 
interest in importing foreign capital and, therefore, have signed bilateral 
treaties for the protection of investments suitable to attract foreign 
investors and their investments to their territories.  
 
3. These bilateral treaties, signed by two states, provided the international 
set of rules that would be considered in the investment relation between 
them. On one side, there is an exporting-capital state who aims to protect 
its nationals. Nationals from these states are willing to export their capital 
to invest in the host state. On the other hand, the importing-capital state 
(Host state) must guarantee the adequate treatment of the foreign 
investments, and therefore attract foreign investment to its territory. 
 
4. Such circumstances entail investor-state complex relationships. The 
complexity is founded mainly on their opposing interest. On the one side, 
the investor’s private interest is seeking profit. On the other side, the 
public interest of the host state is searching for the satisfaction of public 
needs.  
 
5. In consequence, investors and host states’ complex relationships have 
formed the treaty investment regime. Many of those relations have resulted 
from investment disputes where, in most cases, investors were claiming 
the protection of their property. In the disputes, arbitral tribunals are in 
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charge of interpreting the set of rules that bilateral investment treaties 
provide to elucidate such disputes and of applying them to find a solution. 
 
6. In the development of the dispute settlement system, some investors have 
claimed the protection of their legitimate expectations. However, tribunals 
have inconsistently and sometimes wrongly elaborated the jurisprudence 
that establishes the scope and content of the concept. Currently, it is 
widely accepted that legitimate expectations are the core of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard (FET standard).  
 
 
B. Significance and justification  
 
7. Although there is agreement regarding legitimate expectations as being the 
main element of the FET standard1, the legitimate expectations notion 
remains unknown. In the past, tribunals’ attempts to elaborate the notion 
was a failure. Thus, their awards brought confusion and a lack of 
understanding.  
 
8. Current circumstances, for example, state treaty practice and the new 
approaches provide a better perspective. Though the scope and content of 
the legitimates expectations is not totally determined, it is also unclear and 
misunderstood.  
 
9. The proper understanding and clarity about the boundaries of legitimate 
expectations under the FET standard would facilitate the protection of the 
interest, both for claimant’s and respondent’s. In the future, their 
understanding may result in more precise claims and consistent defenses, 
as well as full observance of legitimate expectations.  
 
10. For these reasons, the present research pretends to assess the issues of 
uncertainty regarding the scope, content and legal nature of the notion of 
legitimate expectations.  
 
 
                                                        
1 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 
May 2003, para. 154 See also among many: MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Chile, 
ICSID Case. No. ARB/01/7 Award, 25 May 2004, para. 114, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. 
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, Award, 12 May 2005, para. 279, and LG&E Energy Corp et 
al. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, para. 127. 
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C. Research Question  
 
 
The research question which was adopted by the author for the 
purpose of this thesis is: What is the notion of the legitimate 
expectations’ protection within the frame of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard in international investment law? 
 
D. Aim of the research  
 
 
The main objective of the present research is:  
 
i. To clarify the notion of legitimate expectations under the fair and 
equitable standard.   
 
The secondary objectives of the research are:  
 
i. To identify the legal nature of legitimate expectations. 
ii. To distinguish the limits of the protection under the FET standard.  
 
 
E. Methodology  
 
 
11. In line with the research objectives, the present study is comprised by 
following a qualitative descriptive method through, first a doctrinal 
research and, second a comparative analysis. The object of study is “the 
legitimate expectations” and it is delimited by the frame of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard in international investment law. 
 
12. Within the doctrinal research are examined recent and relevant 
documents that elaborate a preliminary notion of legitimate expectations 
in a general basis. Furthermore, documents where the essential elements 
of the notion are identified and analyzed. Once the preliminary notion is 
settled the study focuses on legal documents, mainly cases, of three 
regimes of international law that interpreted and apply the preliminary 
notion in distinctive manner.  
 10 
 
13. The notion of legitimate expectations is elucidated considering the 
comparison of the three regimes of international law and the approach to 
the different lines of interpretation and application in international 
investment law. Also, a comparative study of case law is utilized 
descriptively to distinguish the application of legitimate expectations in 
the scope of the fair and equitable standard.  
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II. PART ONE 
 
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS AND ITS BOUNDARIES WITHIN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW – PRELIMINARY REMARKS  
 
A. Outline  
 
1. Prior to immerging into the legitimate expectations concept as the core of 
the fair and equitable treatment ascribed to the field of international 
investment law, in this first part, the abstract notion of legitimate 
expectations will be studied, and will be specified by scrutinising the 
notion in a deductive manner. The procedure pursued to develop this 
specific subject of study can be summarised as follows:   
 
2. The procedure consists of four steps deductively analysed. Those are: i) 
establishing a general definition or preliminary approach; ii) ascribing 
that definition to a specific field of international law; iii) establishing the 
nature of legitimate expectations; and iv) locating the origin of the 
legitimate expectations’ obligation within the sources of international 
investment law. 
 
3. Regarding the first step of the process, to establish a general definition 
or preliminary approach, the legitimate expectations derived from the 
general principle of good faith will be considered. This concept or 
definition will be established through the developments of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
and international arbitral tribunals. 
 
4. Afterwards, this definition will be ascribed to international investment 
law by considering the formulation established by different investment 
arbitral tribunals within their jurisprudence. Then, the nature of 
legitimate expectations will be identified in the jurisprudence of the same 
tribunals, in line with the third step. 
 
5. Finally, the perspective of legitimate expectations in international 
investment law will be enunciated. Step four will be considered in detail 
in part II with a complete elaboration of both the sources of international 
law and international investment law.  
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B. Preliminary Definitions 
 
6. Various authorities have determined a notion of legitimate expectations. 
Each of them has provided a meaning, depending on its place in the 
international legal system, its functions and the type of legal relationships 
each of them is acquainted with.  
 
i. International Court of Justice (ICJ)  
 
7. Although the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has recently2 denied the 
existence of the principle of legitimate expectations in general 
international law with reference to arbitral awards in investment 
disputes, legitimate expectations in state-state relationships had emerged 
from the application of the principle of good faith by the early ICJ of 
1951.3   
 
8. The ICJ established back then that the principle of good faith operates as 
a source of obligations to states. In the specific Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries 
Case, (1951), the principle requested that the legitimate expectations 
created be respected for reasons of equity and legal security.4  
 
9. Following the Court’s analysis of that case, it was not conduct that created 
those legitimate expectations, but the United Kingdom’s inaction. The 
dispute consisted of the validity of the system applied to the drawing of 
baselines and defined the contention about water limits between the UK 
and Norway. The latter state, through an administrative decree, extended 
its straight lines towards the sea, drawing baselines, which was 
detrimental to some English fishermen who used to fish in those waters.   
 
                                                        
2 Bolivia v. Chile, Obligation to negotiate access to the Pacific Ocean, ICJ judgment of October 
1/2018. Para. 162. Bolivia claimed that through Chile’s multiple declarations the “expectation of 
restoring” Bolivia’s access to the sea will fulfiled. On the other hand, Chile argued that Bolivia 
had not demonstrated the existence of a legitimate expectations’ doctrine in International Law. 
The ICJ recognised Chile’s posture clarifying that, though legitimate expectations are mentioned 
in arbitral awards of state-investor investment disputes, the existence of that doctrine in general 
international law is not proved by those references.  
3 The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, (1951): ICJ reports 1951. P. 116. 
4 Robert Kolb, ‘Principles as Sources of International Law (2006) 53 Netherlands International Law 
Review 1, p. 21. 
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10. The Court established that when Norway enforced its straight lines5 no 
state interested in the status of the water contested it. This included the 
UK and by not contesting it for a period of more than sixty years, it had 
accepted that system of delimitation or its application. This is due to the 
acquiescence by inaction on the part of the United Kingdom.  
 
11. Therefore, since the delimitation was consistently applied by the 
Norwegian authorities and it did not find opposition on the part of the 
UK, the ICJ warranted the enforcement of the system by Norway against 
the United Kingdom.6 
 
12. In summary, legitimate expectations are the idea of one state regarding 
the other state’s conduct, who by its action or inaction creates a 
reasonable and justified assurance to the first state that its behaviour will 
be in accordance with what is expected in relation to certain matter.7 It is 
not completely clear if those representations alone create an autonomous 
obligation to the state.  
 
13. However, by virtue of the principle of good faith, equity, acquiescence and 
estoppel, a new right is born for the state that reasonably expects a 
certain behaviour and a new equivalent obligation is burdened on the 
state that has created that expectation.   
 
ii. World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
 
14. The legitimate expectations of the WTO, within the specialised trade 
regime of international law, have been recognised as an independent and 
separate principle. This is in contrast to the general international law 
approach which is built and applied from other principles. In the words 
of Ernst Petersmann8, the WTO system is rule oriented. It entails the 
                                                        
5 Norway decided unilaterally to delimit its waters by the enactment of a decree. States can delimit 
their waters by either drawing normal baselines or straight baselines. The first considers all 
sinuosities of the cost. The second connects, uttermost islands, promontories and rocks with 
straight lines. Nugzar, Dundua. Delimitation of marine boundaries between adjacent states. 
United Nations. 2006-07. P. 15 
6 See Supra note 4, p. 22.  
7 Muhammad Nasiruddeen, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Balancing 
between State’s Legitimate Regulatory Functions and Investor’s Legitimate Expectations, PhD 
thesis, University of Dundee, 2015. p. 202 
8 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, 
International Organisations and Dispute Settlement, 2012. P. 66 – 67. 
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observance of general rules by governments and individuals in order to 
reconcile their conflicting short-term trade interest with their common 
long-term interest.    
 
15. Therefore, this characteristic of the WTO system has ensured that the 
principle of legitimate expectations fully permeates its jurisprudence.9 
The application of this principle is indispensable to international 
agreements; indeed, it is fundamental to the World Trade Organisation, 
since it creates trust in negotiations and facilitates dispute settlement. 
 
16. Now, the legitimate expectations notion in the WTO does not differ from 
the general international law definition. Simply it aims to emphasise its 
application as principle to the trade behaviour of states and individuals. 
Basically, it provides the assurance created by a state or individual toward 
another WTO member that its trade behaviour will be consistent with the 
regime’s basic rules.    
 
17. Further, every member of the WTO in particular, is protected by the 
legitimate expectations in three respects: i) the maintenance of 
generalised conditions affecting future trade; ii) the consistency and 
predictability of the WTO’s law; and iii) the equal competition conditions 
among members.10 Namely, WTO members are entitled to form legitimate 
expectations regarding the other members’ trade behaviour.  
 
18. In concrete cases, the legitimate expectations in the WTO regime were 
invoked in three different scenarios, before both panels and an appellate 
body. The first scenario concentrates on the measures of a member in 
violation to an obligation of WTO law.11 It means that the frustration of 
legitimate expectations leads to a later violation of the General Agreement 
                                                        
9 See Supra note 7, P. 204. 
10 For instance, the Japan-Film panel alludes to this third function of legitimate expectations. 
Japan – Film Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 
WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 April 1998, DSR 1998: IV, 1179. 
11 For instance, EC-LAN panel applied LE and determined this scenario: Entitlement, the US was 
entitled to legitimately expect to receive the same treatment regarding LAN equipment agreed 
tariffs. Frustration, Legitimate Expectations were frustrated by a change of the reclassification 
practice in Europe. Violation (causal link), EU violated Article II: 1 GATT by failing to accord 
imports from US. EC – Computer Equipment Panel Report, European Communities – Customs 
Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS62/R, WT/DS67/R, WT/DS68/R, adopted 
22 June 1998.  
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on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). However, an appellate body in India-patent12 
rejected this approach arguing a misinterpretation of Article II: I GATT by 
the panel.  
 
19. The second scenario refers to non-violation measures of the WTO rules, 
i.e. to measures that nullify or impair a benefit. Due to the non-violation 
measures’ nature in this scenario, the legitimate expectations “help in 
assessing”13 the predictability and, therefore, the validity of a benefit 
considering the measures consistency.14   
 
20. The third scenario illustrates the creation of legitimate expectations from 
Panel and Appellate Body reports. It simply lies in that every member of 
the WTO expects correspondence with those reports from the panel and 
appellate body, even though they only bind the parties in dispute on the 
concrete report considered.15 Finally, as a conclusion and for a better 
understanding of the notion of legitimate expectations in WTO, a brief 
description of the WTO system is provided.  
  
21. As a response to the need to secure an international economy, in 1947 
the GATT was signed and ever since, it has constituted the framework for 
international trade relations.16 From the very beginning, this organisation 
aimed to deal with discrimination, market access, transparency, rules on 
fair trade, trade liberalisation, and dispute settlement procedure.      
 
22. The dispute settlement procedure, as long as the system became more 
rule-orientated by practice, adopted the term panel in reference to 
disputes. However, this system has sought primarily to resolve issues 
through agreement between the parties, and panels have become an 
effective procedure to provide an authoritative decision to settle any 
dispute when an agreement has not been possible. Lastly, when the 
                                                        
12 India – Patents (US) Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, DSR 1998: I, 9 [42]. 
13 See Supra note 7, p. 212. 
14 See supra note 10. The Japan-Film panel clarified the required test to determine the violation 
to legitimate expectations in this scenario. Test: i) Application of a measure by a WTO member; 
ii) a benefit accruing under the relevant agreement; iii) Nullification or impairment of the benefit 
as a result of the application of the measure.  
15 See an example in: Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/ DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 
1996, DSR 1996: ‘I, 97. 
16 Ibid. supra nota 6, p. 212 
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solution does not satisfy the parties, they appeal before the appellate 
body. 
 
iii. Conclusion 
 
23. Previously, it was studied the legitimate expectations notion considering 
general international law and WTO rules. Main points were: Firstly, the 
most important judicial authority, ICJ, does not recognise legitimate 
expectations as an autonomous principle with direct application, but as a 
simple construction from other principles, especially good faith.  
 
24. Secondly, the legitimate expectations notion in WTO is much more 
elaborate and is considered an autonomous principle, which in many 
cases has been applied and, thus, has permeated the WTO jurisprudence.  
In relation to the notion of legitimate expectations elaborated by 
international investment case law the study now turns to.  
 
iv. Introductory remarks of Investment law 
 
25. The legitimate expectations notion was referred to in Bolivia v. Chile, 
before the ICJ, in the terms explained previously.17 The first remark to be 
made in relation to the international law notion is that the ICJ did not 
recognise the existence of legitimate expectations in international law by 
extension to arbitral awards of international investment law. However, the 
court never denied the existence of an independent notion for general 
international law, and since Bolivia did not argue nor provide evidence on 
the matter, the court simply avoided making a background analysis.  
 
26. One hypothesis of the court’s reluctance to complete the analysis could 
be that the legitimate expectations notion elaborated by investment 
arbitral awards is reductive, applicable only to investor-state disputes. In 
general terms, it is logical since the investment notion contains variables 
not found in international law in general. For instance, legitimate 
expectations are the main element of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard. It is not clear how it could be applicable in the same terms to 
disputes including other subjects of international law.  
 
                                                        
17 See supra para. 7 and footnote 1.  
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27. Now, another element to comment on is the similarity of the three 
regimes about good faith being harbinger to legitimate expectations. 
Arbitral awards have referred to this important principle in this manner. 
In relation to the WTO notion, the investment law notion is not as 
rigorous, as clear and as properly understood as it is to global trade 
relations. One possible explanation for this may be found in the WTO 
itself, which provides a multilateral agreement among members that 
promote cooperation in bilateral negotiations and even in disputes.  
 
28. The international investment law notion of legitimate expectations has 
been formed sui generis from prefabricated notions of other regimes. Its 
constitution entails some variables that are necessary to highlight here.  
 
29. In general, those variables are summarised by the fact that international 
investment law is one of the multiple examples of international law’s 
fragmentation and its biggest consequence refers to the lack of 
understanding on the part of authorities, hence, leading to fragmented 
jurisprudence (interpretation mainly) and therefore causing uncertainty 
about the rule of law.    
 
30. Variables, such as the large number of cases, the bilateral investment 
treaty (BIT) on which every single dispute is based and whether it is in the 
context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tribunals 
or the International Centre for Settlements of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
tribunal are the most important to consider in order to understand the 
legitimate expectations notion. Now, aiming to identify the notion in 
investment law, three categories will be reviewed. Each of these categories 
provides a relative notion. However, at the end of the present written 
piece, a concept of legitimate expectations in international investment law 
will be synthetised.    
   
v. Investment Case Law 
 
31. Firstly, the aim is to examine the notion through the first line of 
jurisprudence started by Tecmed v. Mexico18. This tribunal approach is 
                                                        
18 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 
May 2003, para. 154 See also among many: MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Chile, 
ICSID Case. No. ARB/01/7 Award, 25 May 2004, para. 114, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. 
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, Award, 12 May 2005, para. 279, and LG&E Energy Corp et 
al. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, para. 127.  
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characterised by the fact that it included legitimate expectations within 
the fair and equitable treatment standard. Furthermore, the base BITs are 
diverse. However, all the cases that compounded the line of interpretation 
were before ICSID tribunals.  
 
32. Secondly, the emblematic notion developed by the tribunal in the case 
Thunderbird Gaming Corporation19 will be analysed. Though the tribunal 
did not protect investor’s legitimate expectations, it provided a well-
explained notion in the framework of NAFTA. Likewise, separately, 
Thomas Wälde’s20 opinion of the origins, scope and role of legitimate 
expectations will be mentioned, which ultimately introduces the third 
category.  
 
33. Thirdly, the so-called comparative approach elaborated more recently by 
the Total v. Argentina21 tribunal and Toto construczioni v. Lebanon22 will 
be considered. This notion supports Thomas Wälde’s opinion which is 
more elaborate, since it considers different sources, in particular 
domestic law. Besides, it argues that legitimate expectations could be 
understood and applied as a general principle of law.   
  
34. Following the structure proposed above, the tribunal in Tecmed define 
legitimate expectations as: “the basic expectations that the foreign 
investor took into account to make the investment”23. Now, this definition 
is tied to the word “treatment” that alludes to the fair treatment that the 
host state has to provide to the investor.24 From this mere definition a link 
between fair and equitable treatment standard and the notion of 
legitimate expectations can be perceived.  
 
35. Furthermore, the term “basic expectations” means that the host state has 
“to act in a consistent manner”. However, the nature of this consistency 
is not sufficiently clear, it provided other terms attempting to define it, 
such as “free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations 
                                                        
19 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award, 26 
January 2006. 
20 Ibid. Separate opinión of Thomas Wälde. Para. 1, 20, 21.  
21 Total S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, 27 December 2010. 
22 Toto Construzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award, 7 June 2012. 
23 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 
May 2003, para. 154 
24 Ibid.  
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with the foreign investor” or “to know beforehand all the rules and 
regulations that will govern its investment”25.   
 
36. Also, in the words of the tribunal, these expectations mean “to act without 
arbitrarily revoking any preexisting decisions or permits issued by the 
state or use legal instruments that govern the actions of the investor or 
investment in conformity to the law”26. It is not evident in relation to what 
exact conduct the state must be consistent to offer fair treatment to the 
investor. Instead, its interpretation remains wide open and can lead to 
many different outcomes since the term “consistency” is a relative 
concept. 
    
37. Douglas Zachary27 criticises the interpretation in Tecmed and asserts that 
the standard found by this tribunal is not a standard at all. Conversely, it 
is an utopic ideal of perfect regulation for states ever to attain. Besides, 
the notion is unsupported by any authority and he regrets the fact that 
now it constitutes the most important precedent on the matter. Likewise, 
the White Industries v. India tribunal28 validates this criticism as well. 
 
38. Continuing with the second category, Thunderbird Gaming v. Mexico29 the 
tribunal defined legitimate expectations as: “the situation where a 
contracting party’s conduct creates reasonable and justified expectations 
on the part of the investor to act in reliance to said conduct”30.  
 
39. Beyond that, the tribunal ascribed the interpretation “within the context 
of NAFTA framework” and most importantly to highlight it, it established 
a consequence in the event that the host state does not adjust its conduct 
to the investor’s legitimate expectations -causation of damages- therefore, 
it implies valuation of damages and the condemnation of the defaulter 
state. 
 
                                                        
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Douglas Zachary, Nothing if Not Critical for Investment Treaty Arbitration: Occidental, Eureko 
and Methanex, 2006. 
28 White Industries Australia Limited v. India, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 30 November 2011, para. 
10.3.5 
29 See supra note 19, para. 147. 
30 Ibid. 
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40. Now, in regard to Thomas Wälde’s separate opinion31, he agrees with the 
general view of the notion retrieved, the general conditions for claiming 
a protection of legitimate expectations. Nevertheless, he does not concur 
with the application of the standard to the specific factual situation that 
the tribunal made.32 The first two points will be examined below and in 
part III an approach to his disagreement will be elaborated.  
  
41. In accordance with the first point, the general view of the notion, he 
alludes to separating the term “expectations” from “legitimate” to 
distinguish the concepts that legitimate expectations together contain. He 
clarifies that the term expectations imposes to the state the burden to 
properly communicate its messages or statements to the investor.33  
 
42. The burden means to “avoid ambiguity”, “send clear messages” and 
“correct misinterpretation”34. Besides, he considers that investors have a 
necessity to predict the government’s conduct and, therefore, the state is 
obliged “to take into account prior assurances”35 communicated to the 
investor. Ultimately, expectations are created when assurances made by 
the state promote in the investor the willingness “to commit risk capital 
and effort”36.  
 
43. To complement the idea, the term “legitimate” entails the competence of 
the official who communicates an affirmation in the name of the state. 
Additionally, the affirmation has to be “reasonable”. To synthetise, for 
Thomas Wälde legitimate expectations are: reasonable assurances made 
by the state, which are clearly communicated to the investor by a 
competent state’s official through a legitimate procedure.  
 
44. To be reasonable, the assurances have to respond to the following 
question: Do these assurances (prior fulfilment of the elements explained 
before) exhort the investor to commit risk capital and effort? 
 
                                                        
31 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award, 26 
January 2006, Separate Opinion of Thomas Wälde. 
32 Ibid., para. 1 
33 Ibid., para. 21 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
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45. Considering the second point, the general conditions for claiming a 
protection of legitimate expectations, he proposes: i) expectations caused 
by a government; ii) an investment relying on such expectations; iii) 
competency of the responsible officials and the procedure followed in the 
creation; and iv) the reasonableness of the expectations. In short, he 
names the concepts identified in each term as “conditions for claim”.  
 
46. Moving forward, in the third category, the comparative approach 
proposed by Total v. Argentina37 tribunal examined and determined that 
a comparative analysis of legitimate expectations is justified. Finding that 
in civil law and common law jurisdictions, they are recognised and well 
determined, the analysis consists of comparing concepts in different 
domestic legal systems.38 However, this point will be elaborated further in 
part III.  
 
47. For now, in the next set of paragraphs the notion of legitimate 
expectations will be synthetised, considering all three categories. The 
classification proposed by the comparative approach will be enunciated 
later in part III, and will be elaborated in detail.  
 
C. Compound Definition in International Investment Law and Legal 
Nature 
 
i. Synthesis of the notion    
 
48. Previously, the notion of legitimate expectations in international 
investment law was examined considering various nuances compressed 
into three categories. Each category groups the most relevant elements 
into considerations to easily deduce the notion.  
 
49. What can be observed, after the previous examination is that legitimate 
expectations are: reasonable assurances made by the state, clearly 
communicated to the investor, by a competent state’s official through a 
legitimate procedure. To be reasonable, the assurances have to respond 
                                                        
37 Total S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, 27 December 2010, 
para. 111. 
38 Michele Potestà, Legitimate expectations in investment treaty law: Understanding the roots and 
the limits of a controversial concept, ICSID Review 2013, p. 7. 
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to the question: Do these assurances (prior fulfilment of the elements 
explained before) exhort the investor to commit risk capital and effort? 
 
50. Thomas Wälde’s examination of the notion is the clearest. It distinguishes 
every concept, circumstance and characteristic of the legitimate 
expectations notion. Yet, this does not mean that his analysis is correct 
or that it prevails over the others. The explanation permits the 
identification of every aspect of the other category’s notions.  
 
51. It is therefore, appropriate to take this notion into account to examine its 
nature, scope and application in the following part. Besides, this concept 
reconciles all three approaches and gives birth to the comparative 
approach, which is currently the most favoured one.  
 
ii. The legal nature of legitimate expectations  
 
52. Until now, in accordance with the notion examined before, legitimate 
expectations are understood as a protection to the investor which 
implicitly contain an obligation to compensate damages caused by the 
state. The protection has been classified within the fair and equitable 
treatment standard, and the state in order to treat the investor fairly has 
to fulfil the burdens aforementioned.  
 
53. Seeking to bring more clarity to the nature and origin of the legitimate 
expectations protection, in the next part, the sources of international law 
and international investment law will be studied, aiming to locate the 
source of law which enables the investor to find an extended protection 
to his investment.  
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III. PART TWO 
 
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE OBLIGATION OF 
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
i. Sources of law  
 
54. With respect to the sources of law, there is a notorious tradition to 
approach the matter by referring to a well-known metaphor39. It consists 
of making reference to the literal significance or meaning of “source”. 
Source literally means a spring of water, the rising point of a stream of 
water from the ground. Nevertheless, it signifies the rising, but not the 
cause of existence of that water.  
 
55. In order to explain the meaning of sources of law, the majority of 
scholars40 often use this metaphor pretending to graphically illustrate the 
origin of a certain law, rule or even principle. Yet, the real meaning of 
source cannot only be reduced to its origin.  
 
a. Definition of sources of law  
 
56. Sources of law means the source of the legal rights and obligations of the 
parties in relation to a legal instrument. For instance, in a specific 
jurisdiction, the law promoted by the legislator is a source of law, since it 
gives birth to the rights and obligations to the population on the part of 
the state. A contract is a source of law as well, both in domestic and 
international law. It contains the rights and obligations of the parties who 
enter into it. In international law, the treaties present the most common 
origin of the state’s obligations and rights, likewise in unilateral acts.  
 
b. Written legal norms and unwritten norms 
                                                        
39 Applied by: H. Lauterpacht, L. Oppenheim International law, vol. I, Eighth edition, London 1957, 
para. 24 – 25. 
40 For instance, Ibid.  
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57. The foregoing definition contemplates, however, only the written legal 
norms, although there are agreements that provided obligations and 
rights but not in written form.41 One example of this are customary rules. 
They are unwritten norms because they are established through the 
practice of the state and recognised as law. Therefore, a more suited 
definition is: the written or unwritten sources of legal rights and 
obligations to persons ascribed to a legal community. Now, in a deeper 
sense, the meaning of the sources of law can be classified. 
 
c. Law-creating processes and law-determining agencies 
 
58. According to its bare form or its origin, the term sources of law has a 
concrete meaning. Scholars have identified it as “the law-creating 
processes.”42 Additionally, both “law-determining agencies”43 and “law 
creating process” complement each other. 
 
59. The law creating processes are literally a series of acts directed to produce 
or give birth to laws, rules or principles. For instance, in international law, 
the agreement and signature of a treaty between states portrays the most 
basic process in creating rights and obligations of international law.  
 
60. Conversely, the law-determining agencies do not create a law, instead, 
they aim to clarify the content and the scope of a certain existing law or 
rule. For example, the International Court of Justice usually interprets a 
treaty between two states and determines various rules within that law to 
apply it in the event of a concrete dispute between the two states 
concerned, but has no law-creating power.  
 
61. Further, within the law-creating processes the primary sources of law are 
classified, whilst within the law-determining agencies the subsidiary 
sources of law or material sources are classified. Now moving forward to 
a particular system of sources of law, the international system of sources 
of law will be better illustrated.  
  
                                                        
41 V.D, Degan, Sources of international law, Martinus Nijhoff publishers, Boston, 1997, p. 8 
42 George Schwarzenberger, International law, International law as applied by international courts 
and tribunals, Vol I, London 1957, p. 26. See also: Herbert Briggs, the law of nations, second 
edition New York 1952, p. 44. 
43 Ibid.  
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B. Sources of International Law 
 
i. Traditional canon of international sources of law 
 
62. In international law, the sources of law have been classified into primary 
sources and subsidiary sources, so as to avoid the ambiguity of the term 
“source”. Some scholars refer to the strict doctrine that distinguishes 
between them as the traditional canon of international sources of law.44 
This part of the doctrine gives an enormous relevance to the primary 
sources: treaties, custom and general principles of law.45  
 
63. Further, when approaching the authorities of international law that 
provided an enumeration of the sources of international law, the 
relevance of the primary sources varies. Initially, the Twelfth Hague 
Convention in 1907 provided a hierarchy among the sources of law. 
Currently, in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, this 
distinction is not clear.  
 
ii. Historic transition  
 
64. Historically, the first explicit recognition of the sources of international 
law was in Article 7 of the Unratified Twelfth Hague Convention (1907). It 
enumerates treaties, custom and general principles of justice and equity 
and gives them hierarchy in a subsidiary manner. In other words, in the 
absence of a treaty, the judge will apply custom and in the absence of 
custom it will finally rely on the general principles of law. At that time, it 
was thought that, in this manner, the danger of non liquet could be 
effectively eliminated.46  
 
65. Later, in 1920 a far more relevant enumeration in the determination of 
the sources of law appeared in Article 38 of the statute of the Permanent 
Court of Justice. This article, slightly amended, became Article 38(1) of 
                                                        
44 Patrick M. Norton: The role of precedent in the development of International Investment Law, 
ICSID Review, Vol 33, No.1. 2018, p. 280 See also Authors in footnote 5 of the same article, it was 
consulted: Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (OUP 2014) from those authors.  
45 Hugh Thirlway: The sources of International Law, oup law 2014 p. 116 
46 See supra note 41. P. 45 
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the Statute of the International Court of Justice in 1945.47 This article 
enumerates the sources of law as follows:  
Article 38  
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law 
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:  
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognised by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognised by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of law.  
 
66. Conversely to what was intended to be established in 1907, Article 38 of 
the International Court of Justice statute did not provide a hierarchy 
among sources. Yet, the doctrine has been identified and divided into 
primary sources and subsidiary sources of law or, as it was mentioned, 
previously law-creating processes and law-determining agencies.  
 
67. Namely, in literal (a) it mentions conventions, referring to multilateral 
treaties and bilateral treaties, in (b) custom, and in (c) the general 
principles of law catalogue, the primary sources. Further in literal (d) 
judicial decisions and doctrine or subsidiary sources of law are 
mentioned.  
 
68. Nevertheless, some scholars48 ascertain that the importance of this article 
has been overrated, since the statute only binds the parties that give 
consent. Doubts among doctrine ultimately locate this enumeration as a 
source within a subsidiary source itself. It is true that the tradition has 
provided in Article 38 enough legal force to become the principal 
reference on which centres of arbitration and tribunals rely upon.49  
 
                                                        
47 Ibid., P. 7 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., P. 4 
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69. Besides, the majority of doctrine ascribes the utmost importance to this 
article due to the fact that the statute, according to Article 92 of the UN 
Charter, is “an integral part of the charter”50 itself. The statute, therefore, 
binds almost all sovereign states in the world. Even the few exceptions 
are bound by it, following the procedure of Article 93 (2) of the charter.  
 
70. In summary, the international law applied by the International Court of 
Justice is binding to all members of the UN. One of its six main organs 
legitimises it with sufficient authority to dictate how international 
disputes shall be solved. It means that in most cases arbitral tribunals 
follow this application of the sources of law to resolve concrete disputes. 
In short, Article 38 contains the most accepted enumeration of the 
international sources of law.  
 
iii. Classification 
 
71. The classification of Article 38(1), its consequences and critics should be 
studied because it has been accepted in doctrine as the sources of 
international law. In addition, its binding character is included within the 
UN Charter and it is reflected in State Practice.51  
 
72. The doctrine attempts to identify a possible hierarchy among the four 
listed sources.52 De Wet quoted by Tudor53, for example, tends to interpret 
Article 38(1) similarly to Article 7 of the Unratified Hague Convention of 
1907. That is to obtain a subsidiary hierarchy explained before in 
paragraph 58. However, agreeing to such an ambitious view can lead to 
errors. 
 
73. Article 38(1) proposes an accepted classification: Treaties, Custom, 
General Principles of Law (Primary sources), Judicial decisions and 
Doctrine (Subsidiary sources). Trying to limit the application of each 
source restrictively is superfluous. All these sources have been applied in 
a complementary manner and proved by practice.54 Accepting the posture 
                                                        
50 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter XIV, Article 92. Consulted in un.org. 
51 See supra note 41. 
52 Ioana Tudor: The fair and equitable treatment standard in the international law of foreign 
investment, Oxford university press, 2008, p. 10 
53 See note 6 in Ioana Tudor’s book: E de Wet, the chapter VII Powers of the UN security council, 
2004, p. 79-80. 
54 See in Supra Note 44, p. 282. 
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that proposes a classification between primary and subsidiary sources is 
correct, if interpreted openly and not restrictively.  
 
74. The sources of law usually are not applied independently i.e. one from 
the other, since they are closely related. It is really unusual for a judge or 
an arbitrator to analyse a treaty and find in it all responses to the dispute. 
At least that is not exactly what the practice demonstrates, as a scholar55 
has explained in the field of international investment law. This is a point 
which will be studied further, later in the text.  
 
75. Now, the level of certainty i.e. of having the rule to apply within a Treaty 
(Formal source) is larger than having to apply a general principle of law, 
specially related to the obligation of the parties, since they will have been 
clearly portrayed there. Nonetheless, the rules contained in judicial 
decisions or arbitral awards tend to be useful and practical, particularly 
in cases where the applicable treaty does not provide the will of the 
parties clearly. Of course, the decision must take into account the relevant 
facts surrounding the case.  
 
76. In summary, the sources of international law are classified in Article 38(1) 
of the International Court of Justice statute. They are accepted by the 
majority of scholars. The sources enumerated in this article, however, 
express in a rigid manner the real system of the sources of law. Therefore, 
limiting this theoretical classification does not restrict its real adherence 
in practice.    
 
77. Currently, the international community has accepted Unilateral Acts and 
some Resolutions of International Organisations as sources of 
International Law56. Although both are not enumerated in Article 38(1) of 
the International Court of Justice Statute, they have an important role in 
establishing and assuring norms and obligations that are binding for 
states.  
 
C. Sources of International Investment Law  
                                                        
55 Ibid.  
56 International Law Commission, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Documents of 
the Fiftieth session, 1998. Agenda Item 7: Unilateral Acts of States. Para. 63-71; See also Abi-Saab, 
“Les sources du droit international: un essai de décon- struction”, quote in the same document. 
p. 3    
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i. Outline  
 
78. In previous lines, the sources of international law, in general, have been 
studied. Now, it is important to analyse more specifically and, therefore 
to study, the sources of international investment law, a subject which is 
pertinent to the origin of the notion of legitimate expectations. Despite 
the classification made by the doctrine that is mainly focused on 
highlighting the application of the primary sources, in this part this 
theory will be questioned. Finally, it will be demonstrated that the practice 
in international investment law differs from scholars’ common 
understanding in this regard.  
 
ii. Classification of sources of international investment law  
 
79. Some scholars57 tend to provide a traditional classification to 
international investment law sources as well, through the establishment 
of principles and rules derived from the following sources of law: The 
bilateral treaties for the protection of investments between states; 
custom, relevant judicial decisions of the ICJ and mainly those extracted 
from arbitral tribunals interpretations within its awards; and general 
principles of law58 and not directly from rules in themselves.   
 
iii. ICSID convention and Article 42  
 
80. The International Court of Justice has considered multilateral treaties as 
an important source of international law, though, in international 
investment law, there are no multilateral treaties that comprehend a large 
number of states, which in any case would be taken as a compilation of 
the law.59 Following Sornarajah on this point, “The only successful 
convention in the field is the ICSID Convention. But, this is a procedural 
convention only, setting up machinery for the settlement of investment 
disputes through arbitration”.60 Without failing to mention the New York 
                                                        
57 M. Sornarajah: The International Law on Foreign Investment. Cambridge University Press, 
Third Edition, 2010. 
58 Ibid., p. 81 
59 Ibid., p. 80 
60 Ibid. 
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Convention of 1958, which is a relevant instrument in the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards by domestic law. 
 
81. In spite of being ICSID convention a procedural convention, in Article 
42(1) the rules that tribunals will base their decisions upon are stipulated. 
It gives a wide range to the parties to decide the rules which they will use 
to resolve any eventual dispute. On this point, Article 42(1) refers to the 
contracting states in the bilateral agreement, at the moment of a bilateral 
investment treaty’s (BIT’s) signature, both states agree what rules shall be 
applied in case of a dispute between one of them and a national from the 
other state.  
 
82. In a subsidiary manner, it then provides that in the absence of the 
previous agreement, the law of the contracting state party to the dispute 
shall apply. Finally, it refers to the applicable rules of international law, 
though Article 38(1) of ICJ statute, which is not mentioned here. 
Nevertheless, that enumeration results pertinent since it might be 
applicable directly or indirectly. In the opinion of scholars61, the 
application of international law refers both to the procedure rules and a 
substantive body of rules.  
 
83. Lastly, in regard to article 42(1), it is important to say that the arbitrator 
should start by determining the nature of the claim, whether it is a BIT 
claim or a contract claim. If it is a contract claim, it will verify whether the 
parties agreed on the applicable law and therefore apply that law. On the 
other hand, if it is a treaty claim, it will directly apply international law.   
 
84. After this brief introduction, this chapter aims to develop a better 
understanding of the sources of international investment law in order to 
locate the precise origin in relation to legitimate expectations. The 
following sources, therefore, will be analysed with the aim of identifying 
it: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Custom, Case law and Judicial Decisions 
of the ICJ and Investment awards, and General Principles of Law.  
 
iv. Bilateral Investment Treaty  
 
                                                        
61 E Gaillaard and Y Banifatatemi: The meaning of “and” in article 42(1), second sentence, of the 
Washington Convention, ICSID Review 18, No. 2, 2003. p. 403  
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a. Definition 
 
85. To understand the concept of bilateral treaty, it is necessary to 
understand exactly what a treaty is. A treaty is a concordance of wills of 
two or more subjects of international law, intended to achieve an effect 
in international law. It represents the creation of a legal relationship of 
mutual rights and duties.62 
 
86. Now, a bilateral treaty is a type of international treaty which received its 
name “bilateral” due to the number of parties that sign it and ratify it, 
which is two. In other words, in this kind of treaty, two states agree to 
achieve an effect in international law creating a legal relationship between 
them.  
 
87. Further, a BIT, condenses these two characteristics and the effect in 
international law aimed by this treaty is that the two states will mutually 
promote and protect the investment of their nationals. They specifically 
address the risk of a long-term investment project and, therefore, provide 
stability to the investors of the contracting states in the BIT.63  
 
b. Object and purpose  
 
88. Unlike other treaties, as mentioned before, the BIT has a specific object 
and purpose which, as scholars64 have said it, “is closely tied to the 
desirability and to the nature of foreign investments, to the mutual 
benefits for the host state and for the investor, to the conditions 
necessary for the promotion of foreign investment”65. Its primary end is 
to remove the obstacles that are not permitting or properly directing 
more foreign investment into the host states. On the one hand, the host 
state receives benefits derived from the economic prosperity promoted 
by foreign investments and on the other hand, the investor mitigates the 
risk of a long-term investment in the territory of the host state.   
   
c. Expansion of the BIT and actual environment  
 
                                                        
62 See supra note 41. p. 9 
63 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer: Principles of International Investment Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, P. 22.  
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
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89. In recent times, the BITs have become an international instrument often 
used by developed states willing to export capital to developing states 
that promise a wide range of opportunities in different sectors. More than 
200 states are now obliged under a series of BITs signed with other states. 
A study shows that there are more than 3,300 bilateral investment 
treaties providing investor-state arbitration under the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules66. It also shows a framework for at least 800 investment treaty 
arbitrations against more than 100 states.67  
 
90. Every BIT is a pact between two states that can decide to oblige 
themselves in different manners, aiming to promote and protect foreign 
investment. This situation has resulted in a variety of rules applicable to 
the same issues, but specifically applied to the cases between determined 
states that decide the rules independently in their BIT. Nevertheless, along 
the development of the tendency of states to sign BITs, there have 
appeared paradigms or models of BITs that contain similar clauses and, 
therefore, rules.  
 
91. The application of these large number of BITs, in at least 800 arbitration 
disputes, has established a diverse number of rules and has created lines 
of interpretation. Most of the tribunals respecting the authority of other 
tribunals that had resolved a similar case prior to them tended to take 
their interpretation as a precedent.  
 
92. The phenomenon has been catalogued by the doctrine as the “de facto 
system of precedent” that in the opinion of some scholars68 is in complete 
opposition to the orthodox canon of sources of international law because 
it considers arbitral tribunal decisions as a main source of law considered, 
by them, a subsidiary source of law.   
 
d. Application of BITs example: Case  
 
                                                        
66 As of 3 December 2016, there were 3.324 IIAs signed. See United Nations: Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2017: Investment and the Digital 
Economy, 2017, p. 111. 
67 UNCTAD reports that as of 1 March 2017, at least 767 investor–State arbitrations had been 
filed. UNCTAD (n 24) p. 114.  
68 Lucy Reed, ‘The De Facto Precedent Regime in Investment Arbitration: A Case for Proactive Case 
Management’ ICSID Review 25, No. 1, 2010, p. 95. 
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93. Pursuing to illustrate in more detail, the content, rules, interpretation 
and application of the BIT by the tribunals the Anglo-Adriatic Group v. 
Albania case will be taken as an example.  
 
General description  
 
94. The case under analysis is a dispute between a National (Corporation) of 
the British Virgin Islands and the Republic of Albania. The Investment 
agreement has been named LFI, it provides (as an example) in Article 8 
the dispute settlement clause (Procedure rule). This clause provided the 
Anglo-Adriatic Group with choices to settle a dispute regarding their 
investment in the Republic of Albania. Article 8(2) established the 
jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal to arbitrate a dispute between the 
Anglo-Adriatic group and the Albanian public administration if the 
dispute is related to expropriation, compensation for expropriation or 
discrimination.69  
 
Rule and application  
 
95. In the corresponded BIT, the Tribunal found the rule to apply in order 
to determine whether it has or not jurisdiction over the dispute. The 
tribunal will have jurisdiction following Articles 1 and 8 requiring the 
fulfilment of three elements: (a) existence of a protected investment; (b) 
existence of a protected investor; and (c) that the claimant is the owner 
or titleholder of the protected investment.  
 
96. Albania argued that the tribunal lacks jurisdiction over the dispute, 
since the claimant does not fulfil elements (a) and (c). In other words, 
there is not a protected investment and there is doubt about the 
property entitlement of the claimant. The tribunal sides with Albania 
because the burden of prove lies with the claimant and it has not 
provided enough evidence to satisfy its interest.  
 
Conclusion  
 
97. The BIT is interpreted as a whole by the parties in the dispute. In this 
interpretation, the parties argue over the rules that they would apply to 
                                                        
69 Anglo-Adriatic Group v. Republic of Albania, ICSID case No. ARB/17/16, Award of February 
7/2019, para 181. 
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make their case. Those rules are related, first to the jurisdiction 
(procedural rules) of the tribunal, and second to the merits (substantive 
rules) of the case. In the example, the parties apply the rule of 
jurisdiction. The claimant, Anglo-Adriatic Group, argues the for the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal while the Republic of Albania, the 
respondent, argues that the tribunal lacks jurisdiction over the dispute.  
 
98. The tribunal interprets the BIT as well. To decide on the matter, one of 
the first elements that it has to determine is the applicable law to the 
dispute. It will decide over the rules in the BIT applied by the parties. 
Contrasting both positions, it verifies which of the parties is correct on 
its interpretation or it provides its own rules and applies them, if 
necessary. In the present case, the tribunal decided to apply the 
interpretation provided by the republic of Albania, since the respondent 
did not fulfil the requirements in the BIT.  
 
e. Legitimate expectations  
 
99. Having a better understanding of the sources of international law and 
investment law, it is also pertinent to identify the origin of the legitimate 
expectations within the sources of law. Among the large number of 
current BITs signed by multiple states, there is no explicit mention of 
the term “legitimate expectations”. There is no specific article in the BITs 
that provided an obligation regarding legitimate expectations.  
 
100. Yet, legitimate expectations’ jurisprudence has been elaborated by 
arbitral tribunals that have encountered a substantial protection to the 
investors’ legitimate expectations in regard to the fair and equitable 
treatment standard provided in the majority of BITs. 
 
101. Since 1999, the legitimate expectations notion has been stressed in the 
autonomous and independent development of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard in arbitral awards. It started since the United Nations 
Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) published a survey70 
related to bilateral investment treaties that year.71 According to the 
UNCTAD, at the moment of publication of that survey there was no 
                                                        
70 UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s (1998), p. 54. 
71 M. Sornarajah. The International Law on Foreign Investment. Third Edition, 2010. p. 354 
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major authority relating to the fair and equitable standard. However, this 
jurisprudence emerged strongly from that very moment. 
  
102. The awards had recognised legitimate expectations as the core of the 
fair and equitable treatment standard substantial protection in the BITs. 
This category of legitimate expectations is characterised by scholars72 
addressing its obligation under three different scenarios: I) obligation 
from a written contract between the host state and a specific investor; 
II) unilateral declarations by the host state; and III) those based on the 
regulatory framework at the time of the investment. 
 
• Cases of legitimate expectations  
 
103. For instance, the Thunderbird v. Mexico tribunal has approached the 
application of a possible rule of legitimate expectations. This tribunal 
had identified the issue in the concrete case: “whether a legitimate 
expectation was created by SEGOB’s letter, dated 15 August 2000, to the 
effect that it brings Thunderbird’s claims in the present case under 
Article 1102, 1105 and/or 1110 NAFTA.”73  
 
104. In this case, the tribunal defines the legitimate expectations within the 
context of the NAFTA framework, as “a situation where a Contracting 
Party’s conduct creates reasonable and justifiable expectations on the 
part of an investor (or investment) to act in reliance on said conduct, 
such that a failure by the NAFTA party to honour those expectations 
could cause the investor to suffer damages”.74 
 
105. In this case, the claimant argues that a letter (oficio) written by the 
SEGOB, administrative entity, and directed to Thunderbird corporation 
created legitimate expectations. This letter, following the claimant’s 
arguments, induced its investment since it guaranteed that the permits 
necessary to operate the investment in Mexico would be provided by the 
administration.   
 
                                                        
72 Michele Potestà, Legitimate expectations in investment treaty law: Understanding the roots and 
the limits of a controversial concept, ICSID Review 2013.  
73 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award, 26 
January 2006. para. 137. 
74 Ibid., para 147.  
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106. The tribunal considered “recent investment case law” and “the good 
faith principle of international Customary Law”75 as sources to evaluate 
the concept of legitimate expectations. The tribunal decided that 
regardless of the standard applied, it did not find that the Letter (oficio), 
submitted by the claimant, generated legitimate expectations upon 
which it could reasonably rely on operating its machines in Mexico.  
 
107. Another example of this matter is El Paso Energy Corp. v. Argentina. This 
tribunal agreed that the fair and equitable treatment standard can be 
“linked to foreign investors’ legitimate and reasonable expectations”. 
However, that expectations, “as well as their violations, have to be 
examined objectively”.76 The tribunal considered that the notion of 
“legitimate expectations” is an objective concept, that is the result of a 
balancing of interests and rights, and that it varies according to the 
context.  
 
f. Conclusion  
 
108. In brief, the BITs, the most important source of international investment 
law, in general, do not explicitly mention the legitimate expectations 
literally in their clauses. Nevertheless, the tribunal has developed a 
jurisprudence that catalogued legitimate expectations as core of fair and 
equitable treatment (FET). Its obligation within this jurisprudence arises 
in three scenarios. Lastly, the case law has established that the legitimate 
expectations and its violation have to be examined objectively, balancing 
interest and rights.  
 
v. Customary International Law (CIL) 
 
a. Definition  
 
109. In international law, a custom is a repeated legal conduct adopted by 
states which became a primary source of international law when it was 
generally accepted by the states as law. Namely, a rule of customary 
                                                        
75 Ibid. 
76 El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, 31 
October 2011, para 356. 
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international law is formed when it appears in a consistent state practice 
and Opinio juris catalogued it as law.77 
 
110. Now, the manifestation of a uniform practice is usually previous to a 
state’s perception of the rule as a binding law. Both are manifested in 
the state conduct; however, both can be identified in other written 
instruments such as treaties, declarations of international organisations 
or unilateral acts of certain number of states consistent in the matter. 
Also, it is relevant to point out the fact that decisions of international 
courts or tribunals influence future practice of states and it leads to the 
creation of new rules of customary law.  
 
111. Regarding international investment law, rules of customary 
international law still play an important role. Many issues, such as: 
expropriation, denial of justice, state responsibility, and minimal 
protection of investors under international law (so-called minimum 
standard of protection) are regulated by customary international law. 
Even if the applicable rules in the dispute between parties are rules 
established in investment treaties, customary rules may be applicable 
and very important.   
 
b. Three stages of customary international law  
 
112. Customary international law as a source of international investment law 
had three stages which provided different content or created 
distinguishable rules from one to the other. The first stage spans from 
the second half of the nineteenth century to the first half of the 
twentieth century and is characterised by the Calvo doctrine, Russian 
Revolution and Mexican position78. The second stage, which started in 
the early 1970s, is characterised in the United Nations General Assembly 
by the New International Economic Order. The third stage started in 
1994 when the Hull rule was positivised in instruments, such as the 
Energy Charter Treaty or NAFTA and it is characterised by developing 
countries giving full protection to the investments of foreign investors.  
 
• First stage  
                                                        
77 See supra note 41, p. 8 
78 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer: Principles of International Investment Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, p. 13.  
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113. The Calvo doctrine developed by Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo means, 
in general, that no foreigner can benefit from a wider protection than 
the one granted to the citizens of that state. Further, international law 
does not differentiate between citizens of the state and foreigners, but 
it provides equal treatment to both. Foreigners, therefore, have to adjust 
their business to be in total compliance of the host state’s law, 
regulations and jurisdiction. 
 
114. Regarding investment law, the Calvo doctrine established the nature of 
the customary international standard of protection to aliens’ property. 
It asserted a correlation between the nationals’ property and the aliens’ 
property. In other words, protection of foreign property can be extended 
or reduced in correspondence to the domestic law of each state. This led 
to either strong guarantees or a total lack of protection of foreign 
property, which was completely tied to national protection of property.79 
 
115. After the Russian Revolution, Calvo’s doctrine was “revived on a 
practical level”80 when the Soviet Union expropriated the national’s 
property and left the alien’s protection empty. Based on the principle of 
Unjust Enrichment, the Soviet Union was condemned to pay 
compensation in the Lena Goldfields Arbitration in 193081 and the 
Customary International standard was settled: the states can 
expropriate foreign property, but they were obliged to pay 
compensation. 
 
116. Further, in similar fashion, in 1938 Mexico’s nationalisation of the US 
agrarian and oil business led to a “diplomatic exchange” between those 
states that gave birth to the Hull rule, which basically reasserted the 
customary standard mentioned in the paragraph above: “The rules of 
international law (Custom) allowed expropriation of foreign property, 
but required ‘prompt, adequate and effective compensation’”, wrote the 
US secretary of State, Cordell Hull, at the time in his famous letter.82  
 
117. These three highlighted points formed the early status of protection of 
the alien in general. Aliens are protected by rules of international law, 
                                                        
79 Ibid. p. 12 
80 Ibid. 
81 See in supra note 78, footnote 44 within that text.  
82 Ibid. p. 13 
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independent from domestic law. They provided that certain measures of 
the host states were unacceptable.   
 
• Second stage 
 
118. In this stage the status of customary law governing foreign property was 
questioned. In this regard, the confrontation was settled between 
developing countries and capital-exporting countries. They chose as 
battleground the UN General Assembly, where the first group of 
countries was and still is in the majority. As early as the 1970s, they 
promoted several resolutions that intended to proclaim a New 
International Economic Order.  
 
119. One of their pretensions was to replace the rules governing the 
expropriation of alien property with domestic rules determined by each 
state. During this period, the customary international rules were 
uncertain until the early 1990s, when the socialist view collapsed.  
 
• Third stage  
 
120. In this stage, Latin American countries started to conclude more bilateral 
investment treaties in the earlies 1990s. Due to the fact that the 
economic independence searched by the New International Economic 
Order led to a financial crisis, instead of promoting economic welfare 
for the people. Therefore, at that time, these countries were trying to 
obtain an alternative source of capital to finance their public 
programmes.  
 
121. Moreover, the recognition that a “great flow of foreign direct investment 
brings substantial benefits to bear on the world economy and the 
economies of developing countries in particular”83 characterised the 
intention of these states to incline their economies to a more foreign 
investment-friendly environment. Among the benefits reaped, host 
states looked forward to improving long-term efficiency through 
increasing competition, transferring capital, technology and expanding 
global trade in exchange for their openness.84  
                                                        
83 World Bank Group, “Guidelines on the treatment of Foreign Direct investment”. Legal 
framework for the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, Volume II:  1992. Preamble 35-44. 
84 Ibid.  
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122. Eventually, these interests turned around the international climate on 
the protection of foreign investment. This is in contrast to the second 
stage and in complete opposition to the application of the customary 
international law standard by developing countries. In this stage they 
granted wider protection to foreign investment than in traditional 
customary law. The Hull rule became the predominant standard of 
customary international law.85   
 
123. Investors can address their claim arguing an obligation breach derived 
from CIL, in which case the tribunal will seek a remedy that is reliant on 
the same source of law.  
 
c. Cases: Custom application in the practice as the basis of a claim 
 
124. Customary international law can be considered as a source of applicable 
law to resolve an investment dispute before an arbitral tribunal. Investor 
could argue that the host state has breached an obligation established 
by customary international law (apart from substantive rights violated 
from BIT). However, the possibility is remote, in some cases the tribunal 
can decide to apply custom, in others is the treaty that redirects to 
custom, or even it can be taken as the applicable law of the dispute. 
 
125. The decision to consider custom is not solely an investor’s decision 
when addressing its claim. As mentioned before the tribunal would 
sometimes refer to customary international law to look for a content, or 
to interpret some ambiguous notions under treaty. Therefore, to 
properly define notions such as FET or FPS Tribunal may refer and look 
for clarifications in custom, when treaty does not provide a clear 
answer.86 Further, the applicable BIT can explicitly provide that certain 
clause is determine by custom. e.g under  NAFTA article 1105 the 
content of the FET standard is equated with the minimum standard of 
treatment under CIL. In this cases, the tribunal might provide a remedy 
to the investor for the breach of its rights under customary international 
law.87 
                                                        
85 See supra note 78, p. 16 
86 Accession Mezzanine Capital LP and DKV v Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/12/3, Decision on 
Respondent’s Objection under Arbitration Rule 41(5), 16 January 2013. 
87 Kate Parlett: Claims under Customary International Law, ICSID Review Vol 31, No. 2 2016. P. 
435. 
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126. However, it is worth noticing that, if the arbitral proceeding is based on 
the BIT, the application of CIL has to be derived from that treaty. In the 
case Generation Ukraine Inc v Ukraine88 the tribunal rejected the 
claimant’s claim based only in custom because it did not have general 
jurisdiction over the causes of action. Custom cannot be invoked 
without a BIT under its base due to procedural evident reasons.89 
 
 
127. Finally, the most pertinent situation to the present study is where the 
protection under the treaty or investment law excludes certain 
protection that might otherwise be available under customary 
international law.90 For example, the applicable BIT literally excludes 
from the FET the legitimate expectations of the investor. These 
expectations can be part of the investor’s claim under customary 
international law. 
 
d. NAFTA approach to customary international law: Minimum 
standard 
 
128. To present a different perspective, the NAFTA treaty among the US, 
Canada and Mexico decided to equate the customary law to the 
obligation of the host states to observe a ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
and ‘full protection and security’ standards in relation to foreign 
investors. Likewise, the CMS arbitral tribunal also equates the minimum 
standard to FET. It clarifies that fair and equitable treatment is no 
different than the minimum standard and its development under 
customary law.91 
 
e. Conclusion  
 
129. In conclusion, following the previous line of analysis, custom can be a 
source of the investor’s legitimate expectations when those expectations 
are derived by the tribunal from applicable customary norms. . 
                                                        
88 See supra note 88, p. 436. 
89 Generation Ukraine Inc v Ukraine, ICSID case No. ARB/00/9 Award of 16 september 2003, para. 
11.3. 
90 See supra note 87.  
91 CMS Gas Transmission Co. V. The republic of Argentina, ICSID case No. ARB/1/08 Award of 
12 May 2005. Para. 284 
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Legitimate expectations will be protected then in such an event, also 
based by the application of customary international law. 
 
vi. Case law and judicial decisions of the ICJ  
 
130. In previous lines, it has been explained how doctrine accords that the 
judicial decisions of the ICJ and arbitral awards constitute only a 
subsidiary source of international law. Furthermore, the role ascribed to 
this subsidiary source was also studied. It plays a part in determining-
the agency of international law in contrast to the creating-processes 
characteristic of the primary sources of law.  
 
131. Nevertheless, the latter is a tendency among scholars that widely differs 
in practice. International investment law practice has been characterised 
by commentators as a ‘de facto system of precedent’92. That is to say, it 
is a system where previous decisions of arbitral tribunals are 
preponderant in the formation of new awards.  
 
132. Beyond that, the rules applied to provide a solution to a case come from 
the interpretation and application that other tribunals had previously 
brought to life in their awards. In the practice of international 
investment law excels a ‘common law’ system, at least with regard to the 
application of the sources of law to concrete cases. 
 
133. In support of such affirmations, Ole Kristian Fauchald developed a study 
of 98 ICSID awards in 2008. He found that when identifying rules of 
international law: i) few tribunals referred to Article 38(1) of the ICJ 
statute and its traditional sources;93 ii) that tribunals cited customary 
international law only in 34 of the 98 awards and general principles of 
law only on four occasions;94 and finally and most importantly iii) that 
the most notable aspect of the tribunals’ jurisprudence was its reliance 
upon case law.95  
 
• Legitimate expectations obligation in case law  
 
                                                        
92 See supra note 68.  
93 Ole Kristian Fauchald, ‘The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals: An Empirical Analysis’, 1984, 
19 EJIL 301, p. 333-334.  
94 Ibid., p. 324-326. 
95 Ibid., p. 343.  
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134. The study of BITs as a source of international investment law 
determined that even though most investment treaties do not literally 
refer to an obligation regarding legitimate expectations, since 1999 the 
majority of arbitral tribunal awards started to develop a (not unified) 
jurisprudence. There, the legitimate expectations obligation has been 
categorised as the core of the fair and equitable treatment clause within 
the BITs.96  
 
135. In summary, arbitral awards, even if just subsidiary sources of 
international law udner the article 38 of the ICJ Statute, have a very 
relevant position in international investment law as a source of law. 
Hovewer, in the international investment law and the texts of BITs, there 
is no explicit provision or reference to the obligation to recognise 
legitimate expectations of investor. It can be concluded that the origin 
of legitimate expectations is mainly derived by the interpretation and 
application of norms of BITs in regard to FET standard, therefore it 
produces the formation of jurisprudence by arbitral awards.    
 
vii. General Principles of Law  
 
a. Definition  
 
136. General principles are rules that emerged from the idea of natural law 
and equity. In the opinion of some authors97, including Charles Fenwick, 
these principles are linked to a fundamental morality and justice 
deduced from the civil law tradition.  
 
b. Legitimate expectations in general principles of law  
 
137. International law has approached legitimate expectations by applying 
various general principles of law that function toward its protection. For 
instance, principles such as good faith,98 and equity. The ICJ has also 
considered these two principles, as basis for recognising acquiescence, 
estoppel and legitimate expectations.  
 
                                                        
96 See supra para. 101. 
97 Antoine Favre’s book in V.D. Degan (supra note 41) book footnote 4 Chapter I. See also: Charles 
Fenwick, International Law, Fourth edition, New York 1965, p. 87.  
98 Robert Kolb, ‘Principles as Sources of International Law (2006) 53 Netherlands International 
Law Review 1, p. 20-24. 
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138. Nevertheless, this doctrine of legitimate expectations has been 
implemented only in the scenario of state-state relationships.99 It has 
never been implemented in investor-state relationship by arbitral 
tribunals.  
 
139. However, authors100 have attempted to extend its application to investor-
state relationships. One has justified its application by stating that an 
analogy would allow for the implementation of this legitimate 
expectations’ doctrine as general principle of law to the disputes arising 
between investors and states.101  
 
140. Nonetheless, this posture seems problematic since analogy in 
international law means “the application of a rule which covers a 
particular case to another case which is similar to the first but itself is 
not regulated by the rule”102 different from what is intendent through 
analogy here. A consistent application by analogy following the previous 
meaning would be applying the existing rule to a case not yet considered 
between states. At first sight, pretending to widen its application, in 
general, to all the investor-state disputes appears to be impossible.  
 
141. The uncertainty regarding the existence of a link between the origin of 
the legitimate expectations obligation in international investment law, 
and the general principles of law as a source of investment law still 
remains. It seems that neither the doctrine nor the jurisprudence is 
willing to inquire soon on this matter.  
 
viii. Conclusion   
 
142. To conclude this part some key points must be highlighted. Firstly, in 
relation to the traditional understanding on the sources of international 
law, they are not completely extended in the same manner to 
international investment law. However, the doctrine has approached the 
                                                        
99 For example, the Port of Portendick case (1843), the Norwegian Fisheries case (1951), The 
Temple of Preah Vihear case (1962). See in: ibid. 
100 Muhammad Nasiruddeen, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Balancing 
between State’s Legitimate Regulatory Functions and Investor’s Legitimate Expectations, PhD 
thesis, University of Dundee, 2015. 
101 Ibid. p. 156  
102 Silja Vöneky, Analogy in International Law, Max Planck, Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, 2008.  
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matter referring to Article 38(1) of the International Court of Justice 
statute reality in the practice of arbitral tribunals, which widely differs.  
 
143. Even though the primary and subsidiary sources of law are applied in 
international investment law, the role of arbitral tribunals is 
predominant, since they determine the content, scope and application 
of the treaties. 
 
144. Secondly, in relation to the origin of legitimate expectations from one of 
the sources of international investment law, most BITs do not mention 
explicitly an obligation to observe and respect the legitimate 
expectations of the investor. Nevertheless, since the content and scope 
of BITs are the primary subject of the “de facto precedent system” or 
interpretations of other arbitral tribunals of BITs, there is tendency in 
the approach to the fair and equitable treatment standard that has 
established that the core of this substantive protection is the obligation 
to observe the legitimate expectations of the investor. 
  
145. Furthermore, customary international law has been ineffectively invoked 
by investors on the protection of legitimate expectations, because BIT 
explicitly excludes the obligation to observe them within the FET 
standard clause. Finally, the general principles of law as a source for 
legitimate expectations jurisprudence cannot be considered in relation 
to state-investor relationships, since it has only been applied to state-
state relationships and analogy does not fulfil the burden to extend it.  
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IV. PART THREE 
  
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS AS THE CORE OF THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE 
TREATMENT STANDARD 
 
A. Outline  
 
146. In the previous parts some preliminary remarks regarding the legitimate 
expectations’ notion (part I) were analysed. Likewise, a close study of 
international sources of law attempted to locate the legitimate 
expectations source within international investment law (part II). 
Moreover, international investment awards have established legitimate 
expectations as the “major element” of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard, which is the topic that will be discussed in part III.  
 
147. Firstly, the fair and equitable treatment’s notion will be elucidated with 
an emphasis on its composition in accordance with the legitimate 
expectations in international investment law. In order to accomplish this 
task, the examination will consider the doctrine’s perspective, and 
highlight related investment arbitration cases.  
 
148. Secondly, as introduced in part I, the comparative approach of legitimate 
expectations will be analysed in detail. The aim is to provide a 
comparison of some domestic legal systems, present a brief overview of 
the reasons underpinning both, a procedural or substantive protection 
of legitimate expectations in international investment law, and address 
the possible global recognition of legitimate expectations as a general 
principle of law.  
 
149. Thirdly, considering the preliminary notion of legitimate expectations 
elaborated in part I and the comparative approach developed in this 
part, the examination will be immerged into a deeper observation of the 
subject of study in the light of international investment law. Further, the 
division of the three scenarios identified in relevant arbitral tribunals 
decisions by Michael Potestà will be exposed alongside their 
requirements in order to provide a guideline for the current study.  
 
 47 
150. Afterwards, some applications of the operational rule on legitimate 
expectations by different arbitral tribunals in regard to each scenario 
will be examined. This practical analysis will provide a clear and simple 
understanding of the legitimate expectations’ application in 
international investment law.  
 
 
B. Notion of the Fair and Equitable treatment standard  
 
i. Doctrine  
 
151. Many scholars have referred to the fair and equitable treatment standard 
in different terms. Nonetheless, from the different pronunciations that 
have been made, some general characteristics can be detected in most 
of them. One that has been repeated several times, is the link between 
the fair and equitable treatment and the protection of property. 
 
152. Sornarajah, for instance, asserts that the most common cause of action 
to invoke the protection under the fair and equitable treatment has been 
the taking of property.103 However, arbitral awards have made a 
distinction between the FET standard and the actual protection of 
property.  
 
153. This is in contrast to the customary international law minimum 
standard. For example, he has highlighted the absence of discussion 
about the minimum standard of treatment’s violation outside the 
context of property taking.104  
 
154. On the other hand, international investment law has distinguished 
between the FET standard and the protection of property without, 
setting apart their close connection. Further, investment treaty law has 
recognised certain standards that the signing host state in the BIT has 
to observe in reference to the investment of the investor protected by 
the same treaty. Sornarajah also affirms that this recognition provides 
                                                        
103 M. Sornarajah: The International Law on Foreign Investment. Cambridge University Press, 
Third Edition, 2010., p. 332.  
104 Ibid. p. 334 
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an independent centre of liability for the state from the taking of 
property.105  
 
155. Nevertheless, from time to time, investment law and specially 
investment awards have been criticised over exceeding the reading of 
state’s obligations.106 Following the distinction of FET from property’s 
protection, it is evident that the standards of treatment created by every 
single BIT guarantee other more concrete standards. For example, the 
protection of the property against expropriation.  
 
156. In other words, the fair and equitable treatment standard is an abstract 
standard whose purpose is to fill the gaps left by more concrete 
standards, as has been asserted by Dolzer and Shreuer.107 These two 
scholars have affirmed, as well, that some treaties might aim to reach 
the fundamental goal of legal stability by providing standards of fair 
treatment. They identified a correlation between the FET standard and 
good faith in its broader sense and some variables related to the notions 
of venire contra factum propium and estoppel.108 
 
157. Now, following this distinction, the question about the meaning of the 
fair and equitable standard has arisen. To respond to this inquiry, some 
scholars such as Martins Paparinskis understand the FET to be a 
“substantive guarantee for the protection of property” specially in 
relation to conducts that pretend to restrict and interfere with it.  
 
158. Paparinskis established the meaning of the FET standard from state 
practice and arbitral decisions. He has observed in those a reference to 
the ordinary meaning of the term, thus concluding that in most cases 
the FET is an obligation formulated in “a broad and general manner”, 
which (at last) is an acceptable interpretative conclusion.109   
 
159. Nonetheless, he was cautious about the definition of FET and offered a 
smart solution to the inclusion of the general clauses in the majority of 
                                                        
105 Ibid. p. 204 
106 Martins Paparinskis: The international minimun standard and fair and equitable treatment, 
Oxford Monographies in International Law, 2013. p. 229.  
107 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer: Principles of International Investment Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, p. 122. 
108 Ibid. p. 123.  
109See supra note 107, p. 112. See also: footnote 12 in the same page.  
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BITs. For Paparinskis, the FET is a standard or rule that oscillates 
between, on the one side “fairness”, and on the other the requirement to 
ensure fairness. Therefore, the interpretation of the FET standard is to 
be made on a discretionary case-by-case basis, by each tribunal.110 
Further, the tribunal must consider the concrete BIT and within it the 
concrete normative elements that promoted and ensured fair treatment.  
 
160. Some of those elements are principles found in state practice (BITs) and 
in earlier decisions that have determined relevant factors for the fairness 
and equity of the state’s conduct. For instance, transparency, due 
process, the stability and predictability of the state acts and the 
legitimate expectations of the investor, among others.  
 
161. The legitimate expectations factor has been identified as the core of the 
FET standard by some arbitral tribunals that have resulted in the 
clarification of the FET notion. In the following paragraphs references 
will be made to some of those approaches.  
 
ii. Case Law 
 
162. In line with Paparinskis’ characterisation of the FET standard clauses, 
most tribunals have come to deal with BITs that establish an obligation 
formulated in a “broad or general manner” relating to the fair treatment 
of investments cover under those treaties. Some of them have to 
approach the subject by determining the ordinary meaning of the terms 
in accordance with the Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties.  
 
163. However, the ordinary meaning of the terms has not provided a 
sufficiently clear image of the FET standard’s notion. Tribunals, 
therefore, have relied on the purpose and object of the BITs by following 
the rule in Article 31 under the same treaty.  
 
164. For instance, the MTD v. Chile tribunal considered the definition of FET 
provided by the claimant. That is, “Fair and equitable treatment is a 
broad and widely accepted standard encompassing such fundamental 
                                                        
110 Ibid. p. 115.  
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standards as good faith, due process, non-discrimination, and 
proportionality”111  
 
165. That is to say, fair and equitable treatment should be understood to be 
“treatment in an even-handed and just manner, conducive to fostering 
the promotion of foreign investment”112. In this case, it relied upon the 
BIT’s object and purpose. Further, arbitrator Schwebel clarified that the 
meaning of the FET standard is defined and applied to specific facts.  
 
166. In CMS v. Argentina, the tribunal also identified a broad and general 
formulation of the FET standard in the applicable BIT. It suits the 
respondent’ defense. In this case, Argentina emphasised the vague and 
general nature of the FET clause. However, the tribunal considered both 
postures proposed by the claimant and respondent. It quoted the 
definition in CME case113 “FET standard is breached by an evisceration of 
the agreements in reliance upon the foreign investor was induced to 
invest”.  
 
167. In this definition, the reductive approach that tends to equate the fair 
and equitable treatment to a broad notion of legitimate expectations 
only is evident. Moreover, the tribunal referred to the Tecmed v. Mexico 
case about this posture. Because in that case the applicable BIT provided 
within the FET clause an enunciation of legitimate expectations, the 
tribunal reduced the whole concept to “the basic expectations that were 
taken into account by the investor to make the invest”. 
  
168. Yet, someone would argue that those basic expectations signified a 
broader concept than the legitimate expectations under the FET 
standard. In other words, that legitimate expectations in lato 
sensu correspond to “basic expectations” in the Tecmed case and 
legitimate expectations in stricto sensu correspond to the main element 
of the FET standard.  Finally, the tribunal in CMS followed the claimant’s 
posture that alleged a notion of a FET standard tied to the maintenance 
of a stable framework for investments. That is the FET standard is 
                                                        
111 Opinion of judge Schwebel quoted in footnote 61 of MTD v. Chile. Para. 109 
112 Ibid. Para 113.  
113 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, Award, 12 May 2005, 
para 267.  
 51 
“inseparable from stability and predictability”114 of the state’s conduct. 
All the above will be examined further later.  
 
C. Comparative analysis: most relevant remarks 
 
 
169. Previously in part I, the legitimate expectations’ approach of 
comparative analysis was introduced in order to define a preliminary 
notion of the topic. In this part, though, the comparative analysis will be 
conducted in-depth. Since, the proposal of the comparative analysis will 
be a tendency in the future.  
 
170. Comparative analysis proposes the recognition of legitimate 
expectations as an emerging general principle of law.115 The majority of 
the domestic legal systems protect legitimate expectations in situations 
of individualised representations that the administration repudiates. 
Protection attracts a restricted judicial review in cases where the 
individual is affected by a general change of policy is exceptional.116   
  
i. Definition  
 
171. This approach consists of comparing the protection of legitimate 
expectations among different domestic legal systems. Apart from 
comparing domestic legal systems, it identifies relevant topics to be 
examined in each domestic system regarding the subject in a more 
specific way. For example, it examines the justification for an emerging 
tendency to approach the legitimate expectations’ protection in a 
comparative manner.  
 
172. In general, legitimate expectations protection is defined by this 
approach as the legal protection from a previous publicly stated position 
of the administration that has caused certain harm to an individual, 
either through a formal decision or informal representation. The 
protection is justified by different theories: on the one hand the reliance 
theory, and on the other the rule of law theory.  
                                                        
114 Ibid. para 276.  
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116 Ibid. p. 11.  
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ii. Reasons to protect the legitimate expectations  
 
173. These two theories provide the main reason for protecting legitimate. 
expectations. The reliance theory conceives the protection from a 
considerable harm caused by the disappointment of an expectation 
created by the decisionmaker.117 The rule of law theory, instead, seeks to 
protect the right to legal certainty and to individual autonomy. It 
conceives legal certainty and individuals’ capability as prerequisites for 
the development of enterprises in the capitalist economy.118 
 
iii. Some aspects of domestic legal systems – bases of comparison  
 
174. Among many of the aspects that this analysis bases its comparison on, 
the following aspects excel: the root of the protection in each system, 
the legitimate expectations’ nature, and the type of protection whether 
it is procedural or substantive.   
 
175. For instance, in Germany the legitimate expectations are rooted in the 
protection of trust, which is wide-reaching.119 In EU law the legitimate 
expectations have particular relevance in the context of retroactive 
application of laws. Also, in the case of the representations of 
community institutions, the legitimate expectations can transpire.   
 
176. Now, considering the nature of legitimate expectations, for example in 
EU law, they are a general principle of law. However, this principle does 
not aim for a stability of the regulatory framework in relation to 
companies.120  
 
177. Yet, the EU considers it as General Principle. Some states do not 
recognise the same nature and they protect other rights instead of the 
legitimate expectations. This is the case of France that protects the right 
                                                        
117 SØREN SCHØNBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9-11, 2000. 
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to be heard, vested rights and legal certainty as opposed to legitimate 
expectations.121  
 
178. The type of procedural or substantive protection has varied from one 
domestic system to the other. For example, in Canada and Australia, the 
protection has been strictly limited to a procedural protection. In 
contrast, in England (for instance) the substantive protection has been 
accepted, though the majority of judges were cautious. They clarified 
that the substantive protection is only viable in exceptional situations.  
 
179. A procedural protection consists of giving the opportunity to the 
individual to state its case, that is to protect the rights of having an 
appropriate hearing and being given adequate notice. Conversely, the 
substantive protection either sets the decision aside or maintains it, but 
awards the individual with compensatory damages.122  
 
180. Finally, to conclude, two points must be highlighted: first in order to 
recognise legitimate expectations as a general principle of law, at the 
very least, a careful examination of the most representative legal 
systems must be made. Second, though it is too soon to proclaim 
legitimate expectations as a general principle of international law, it can 
be considered that it is emerging as such.  
 
D. Legitimate expectations in investment case law  
 
i. Outline  
 
181. In part I, the general notion of legitimate expectations was examined. 
Some remarks were made, and it was concluded that the notion provided 
by Thomas Wälde’s in Thunderbird v. Mexico was the simplest, the 
clearest and the most sufficient to introduce the subject and to continue 
with the analysis of the legitimate expectations’ origin in international 
sources of law.  
 
182. By now, the study has identified a general notion, and distinguished the 
source of law from which legitimate expectations emanate. From this 
point forward, the specific notion that the protection of legitimate 
                                                        
121 See supra note 120.  
122 See supra note 115, p. 9. 
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expectations is adopting will be discussed. For this, Thomas Wälde’s 
notion123 is theoretically useful and can be easily applied by the tribunals. 
However, in practice a more limited notion of the protection has been 
developed. 
 
183. Case law has restrained the protection by judging different degrees of 
legal protection, variant in their magnitude. Further, some diverse issues 
have been addressed when protecting the investor’s legitimate 
expectations.  
 
184. Michael Potestà124 identified three different scenarios where legitimate 
expectations were analysed in investment cases: i) Formal commitments 
in investment contracts; ii) Unilateral declarations of the host state; and 
iii) Change in the regulatory framework of the investment. In the 
following part, those three scenarios will be elaborated, and their 
requirements will be explained.  
 
ii. Formal commitment and contractual rights  
 
185. In this scenario, due to a contractual commitment between the state and 
the foreign investor, legitimate expectations were protected under the 
fair and equitable treatment standard. Namely, it consists of the 
protection of legitimate expectations created by the state when it has 
entered into a formal commitment. Historically, contracts have been the 
classical instruments used for the creation of an obligation. They also 
aim to achieve a level of legal certainty and, therefore, stability.  
 
186. Therefore, this instrument of ultimate relevance in every legal system 
deserves a high level of protection in international investment law. 
Legitimate expectations created upon the entering into a formal 
commitment with the investor have the most cautious protection. This 
has been supported by the Continental v. Argentina tribunal125 that 
categorised different levels of protection.  
 
                                                        
123 See paragraphs 49 – 50 at p. 20.  
124 See supra note 115.   
125 Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 5 September 
2008, para. 261.  
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187. To illustrate this scenario of protection, in MTD v. Chile the claimant 
successfully addressed the legitimate expectations claim. The investor 
argued that the investment contract and other factors had given rise to 
the expectation that the project would be developed. The tribunal in this 
case found that the host state entering into a formal commitment in the 
investment contract and later denying the relevant permits to develop 
the project had violated the legitimate expectations of the investor.126 
Thus in this case, the host state acted unfairly and inequitably.  
 
188. Nevertheless, the protection of the legitimate expectations in this 
scenario can lead to errors and misinterpretations. The intrinsic 
expectation of the contract fulfilment cannot be regarded as the same 
as the legitimate expectations under the FET clause. In Potestà’s own 
words, it would mean the transformation of the FET standard “to a wide 
general umbrella clause” 127, which is indeed erroneous.  
  
189. The tribunal in Parkerings v. Lithuania distinguished the mere 
expectation of the contract fulfilment from the legitimate expectations 
under the FET standard. It clarified that the mere expectation of the 
fulfilment entails a contractual right which might be addressed before a 
domestic tribunal of the host state.128 Hence, it implies that in order to 
frustrate the legitimate expectations under the FET standard something 
else has to be at stake. The tribunal in Duke v. Ecuador129 supported this 
distinction.  
 
190. Therefore, could it be considered as the distinct characteristic of 
legitimate expectation under the FET standard and the mere contractual 
expectation of compliance? In order to be considered a legitimate 
expectation under the FET standard, apart from the contract breach, an 
element involving the sovereign power of the host state must be present. 
                                                        
126 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Chile, ICSID Case. No. ARB/01/7, Award, 25 May 
2004, para. 160-167.  
127 See supra note 115, p. 116.  
128 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, 11 September 2007, 
para. 344 
129 Duke Energy Electroquil Partners and Electroquil SA v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, 
Award, 12 August 2008, para. 358. See also: Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Ghana, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/24, Award, 18 June 2008, para. 335. 
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For example, the contract breach is simply based on the government’s 
arbitrariness.130  
 
191. More clearly, the tribunal in Glamis Gold v. USA131 has clarified the mere 
contractual breach from the breach that entails, for example, a denial of 
justice or discrimination on the part of the host state, in which case the 
protection of legitimate expectations under FET (NAFTA article 1105) is 
completely justified.  
 
iii. Unilateral declarations of the host state  
 
192. Legitimate expectations can also arise from non-formal statements of 
the host state in which the investor based its decision to invest. Those 
statements could be promises, representations, assurances or even 
comfort letters directed to induce the investment.132  
 
193. In some cases, it can involve a breach of contract tied to a non-fulfilment 
of the state representations. Thus, making it almost impossible to 
categorise this scenario of protection. However, tribunals have examined 
the extent to which a promise, assurance, or representation is capable 
of creating legitimate expectations.  
 
194. The Waste Management133 tribunal applied the protection under the fair 
and equitable treatment standard due to the breach of representations, 
made by the host state, which the investor relied on. Arbitral practice 
has established that representations by the host state are capable of 
generating legitimate expectations to the investor. Therefore, they may 
be protected under the FET standard when the host state does not 
consistently fulfil them.  
 
a. Requirements 
 
195. Informal representations do not automatically create legitimate 
expectations. Some tribunals have identified the requirements or 
                                                        
130 Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, Award, 22 December 
2003, para. 51. 
131 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. USA, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award, 8 June 2009, para. 620 
132 See supra note 115, p. 19. 
133 Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, 30 april 2004, para 
98.  
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qualities in the representations to be consider in the protection of 
legitimate expectations under the FET standard. For example, the 
tribunal in El Paso Enegy v. Argentina134 qualifies the representations and 
asserted that it must be specific to be considered in the formation of the 
investor’s legitimate expectation.   
 
• Specificity of the representation  
 
196. The specificity quality was categorised by the same tribunal under two 
separate elements: 1) object and form of the statement; and 2) 
individualisation of the investor. Further, firstly, to be specific the 
assurance may concern the object and the unambiguous form of the 
representation.  
 
• Individualised investor  
 
197. Secondly, the representation must be addressed to the specific 
individual investor, who claims protection, and not in general. In Frontier 
Petroleum v. Czech Republic, the tribunal understood that two letters 
that were reviewed were not an undertaking but a signal to the investor 
of the interest of the host state to negotiate.135 Similarly, the White 
Industries v. India tribunal denied the recognition of legitimate 
expectations due to the lack of specificity of the representation.136  
 
198. Though, the legitimate expectations protection is recognised in cases 
where the host state, in a non-formal manner, makes promises or 
assurances to the investor, and those representations by the state have 
to be specific. To fulfil the specificity, the quality affirmations must be 
content specific assurances related to the investor’s investment and, 
also, they must be directed to the individual investor who will rely on 
them to execute its investment.  
 
iv. The regulatory framework: Stability of the investment’s 
environment 
                                                        
134 El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, 31 
October 2011, para. 375-377. 
135 Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL/PCA, Final Award, 12 November 
2010, para. 455. 
136 White Industries Australia Limited v. India, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 30 November 2011, para. 
5.2.6. 
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199. In the third type of scenario, the legitimate expectations are grounded 
on the certainty of the investor about the general legislative and 
regulatory framework in force, at the time of making the investment. 
The expectations consist of the assurance that the regulatory framework 
will be maintained in time to bring stability to the investor’s investment.  
 
200. In this type of protection, the tribunal has to determine if the legislation, 
regulation and provisions invoked constitute a set of promises and 
commitments whose modification entail a breach of the legitimate 
expectations.137 In this scenario the expectations are rooted in a 
normative regulation, not specifically addressed to the investor.138 
 
201. Now, the main reason to protect the expectations from normative 
regulation is that the fair and equitable treatment standard entails 
regulatory framework stability since the investor bases the decision to 
invest by considering it.  
 
202. The Occidental exploration v. Ecuador139 tribunal referred to the 
applicable BIT preamble and concluded that the “stability of the legal 
and business framework is an essential element of the fair and equitable 
treatment”.140 Thus, the state has an obligation not to alter the legal 
environment in which the investment has been made.141  
 
a. Stability and legitimate expectations v. right to regulate  
 
203. Some arbitral awards give privilege to the state’s right to regulate above 
investor’s legitimate expectations to have a stable framework. The 
Parkerings v. Lithuania tribunal required due diligence on the part of the 
investor. This tribunal asserted that the investor has to anticipate all 
circumstances of change and structure its investment, to make it 
adaptable to the potential changes.142 References to a stable framework 
                                                        
137 Total S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, 27 December 2010, 
para 99.  
138 Ibid. para, 122. 
139 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL/LCIA Case No. UN 
3467, Final Award, 1 July 2004. 
140 Ibid., para. 183. 
141 Ibid., para. 191. 
142 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, 11 September 2007, 
para. 333. 
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in most BITs’ preamble cannot impose the burden upon the host state 
of not changing its laws.  
 
204. However, it is evident143 that the general framework only entails reduced 
expectations with the weakest form of protection, when it is compared 
to contractual commitments and specific promises. Tribunals have 
proposed different tests to determine the violation of the FET standard 
as a result of the change of regulatory framework. It varies from 
consideration of change144, to the manner the change occurs145, up to the 
discriminatory effect146, or the unreasonable nature of such change.147 
 
205. A cautious government who thinks that the regulatory framework is 
justified should give an adequate warning to the investor and also adopt 
transitional measures. In this manner, the change will not be abrupt and 
in case of a dispute, the arbitral tribunal would consider such safeguards 
in favour and, therefore, would not protect the legitimate expectations.148  
 
206. Ultimately, protection requires an analysis of the expectations’ 
reasonableness, determined by the due diligence of the investor when 
planning its investment. Besides, the tribunal has to consider, not only 
the facts surrounding the case but, the political, socioeconomic, cultural 
and historical conditions149 prevailing in the host state at the moment of 
the investment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
143 Total S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, 27 December 2010, 
para. 121-124. 
144 El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, 31 
October 2011, para 184. 
145 PSEG v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, 19 January 2007, para. 254. 
146 Toto Construzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award, 7 June 
2012, para. 244. See also: Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, 
Award, 11 September 2007, para. 337. 
147 Impregilo S.p.A v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award, 21 June 2011, para 291 
148 See supra note 115, p. 35. 
149 Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award, 12 August 
2008, para. 340.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
 
A. Summary  
 
207. The present research has observed different perspectives of the 
legitimate expectations in international investment law. Legitimate 
expectations has not been a motionless topic in international law. 
Conversely, it has been complex and sometimes controversial.  
 
208. At times, the lack of understanding has characterised both complexity 
and controversy. At other times, lack of clarity. Without an 
understanding or clarity, legitimate expectations have been guided 
through unknown and unjustified developments which have added more 
complexity.  
 
209. In accordance with the above and other reasons, the concern to find an 
understanding and clarity directed this study in its attempt to i) identify 
a general notion of legitimate expectations and its variables; ii) 
distinguish the source of the developments in international investment 
law; and iii) categorise the findings in a simple and clear manner.  
 
210. In correspondence with the purposes of the study, it was divided into 
three parts. In the first part, a preliminary notion of legitimate 
expectations, not only in international investment law but in general 
international law and other special regimes was examined. Then, the 
notion was analysed and identified. It was necessary in this first part to 
establish the ground from where the obligation of legitimate 
expectations emerged in international investment law.  
 
211. The second part briefly reconstructed a picture of the sources of both 
international law and international investment law aiming to find the 
source that gave birth to the obligation of states to act in conformity 
with the investor’s legitimate expectations.  
 
212. Finally, the third part the study was strictly delimited to the legitimate 
expectations in international investment law. Here, the emerging 
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recognition of legitimate expectations as a general principle of law 
through the comparative analysis approach was studied. Besides, 
considering the notion examined in part I, in this part the legitimate 
expectations under fair and equitable treatment were categorised under 
three different scenarios of protection. In other words, how the 
legitimate expectations have been protected in multiple investment 
arbitral awards.  
 
 
B. Findings  
 
213. The legitimate expectations are: Reasonable assurances made by the 
host state, clearly communicated to the investor through a competent 
state’s official, following a legitimate procedure. To be reasonable, the 
assurances have to respond to the question: Do these assurances exhort 
the investor to commit risk capital and effort? 
 
214. The legal nature of legitimate expectations is constituted by two 
elements: first, it is a protection to the investor based on the good faith 
principle. Second, it entails two obligations -the state is obliged to adjust 
its conduct to the assurances communicated to the investor. Once this 
first obligation has been breached the second obligation suffices - the 
obligation to compensate damages caused to the investor’s property by 
the state’s maladjusted conduct. 
 
215. To locate the origin of legitimate expectations, it is indispensable to first 
understand that the sources of international investment law operate in 
a “de facto precedent” system, which provide ultimate authority to 
arbitral tribunal’s awards. Arbitral tribunals are almost completely 
responsible for identifying the set rules in investment law. They 
interpret bilateral investment treaties and apply the rules identified 
there to concrete disputes between host states and investors.  
 
216. Therefore, though legitimate expectations are not explicitly established 
in most BITs, arbitral tribunals have considered that they are a prevalent 
element in the fair and equitable treatment standard. The majority of 
BITs provided a clause for this standard, whose principal function is to 
fill gaps left by more concrete standards.  
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217. Bearing in mind the comparative analysis approach, legitimate 
expectations are an emerging general principle of law within 
international law. Unlike domestic legal systems in international 
investment law, the substantive protection of legitimate expectations 
prevails. Most arbitral tribunals that identified them have awarded 
substantive protection to the investor.  
 
218. Yet, legitimate expectations in investment treaty law is not recognised 
as a principle. In particular, the subject has been examined by arbitral 
tribunals within the framework of the fair and equitable standard. Three 
different scenarios to protect legitimate expectations tribunal were 
analysed. Protection of legitimate expectation derived from: i) formal 
commitments; ii) informal representations made by the state; and iii) 
regulatory framework changes. 
 
219. Regarding the first scenario, legitimate expectations under FET differ 
from the mere contractual expectations of contract compliance. 
Protection under FET requires more than a simple breach of obligations 
in the investment contract. The contract breach must be tied to an 
arbitrary use of the host state’s power. For instance, denial of justice or 
a discriminatory measure.  
 
220. In view of the second scenario, for legitimate expectations to be 
protected, representations of the host state must be specific and 
expressly directed to an individual investor. General assurances made 
by the host state are not able to create legitimate expectations and thus 
are not protected, similar to what happens in domestic legal systems.   
 
221. Concerning scenario three, legitimate expectations can arise from a 
change of the investment regulatory framework. Nevertheless, it 
constitutes a weak protection compared to the protection of legitimate 
expectations derived in specific assurances directed to the investor.  
 
222. Furthermore, arbitral tribunals have determined that the reasonableness 
of the expectations must be considered which, at last, depends on the 
diligence implemented by the investor. Finally, to establish the existence 
of the legitimate expectations, tribunals have to study the facts 
surrounding the dispute, as well as the political, socioeconomic, cultural, 
and historical conditions prevailing in the host state.  
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C. Final remarks  
 
223. Sometimes claimants and respondents do not consider important 
elements that can either make a precise claim or a consistent defense. 
Due to the lack of clarity and understanding about the rules applicable 
in each case. Thus, it is necessary to follow a well-structured procedure 
to examine the viability of a legitimate expectations claim.   
 
224. In general, in order to effectively claim the protection of legitimate 
expectations, it is important to consider some conditions: if i) the 
expectations were caused by the host state; ii) the investment relied on 
such expectations; and iii) they were grounded by a competent 
representative of the government who followed the adequate procedure. 
 
225. Moreover, other elements can be helpful at the moment of addressing 
the claim. For instance, determining the possible scenario of protection 
that the facts imply might be applicable for the concrete case. Then, a 
consistent analysis of the similarities between the facts in past disputes 
and the facts surrounding the case being considered can provide a solid 
ground for the development of strong arguments.  
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